Whether art is a means of inclusion?

The art work is from famous Artist

Edvard Munch’s The Scream may be the most iconic human figure in the history of Western art. Its androgynous, skull-shaped head, elongated hands, wide eyes, flaring nostrils and ovoid mouth have been engrained in our collective cultural consciousness; the swirling blue landscape and especially the fiery orange and yellow sky have engendered numerous theories regarding the scene that is depicted. Conceived as part of Munch’s semi-autobiographical cycle “The Frieze of Life,”The Scream’s composition exists in four forms: the first painting, done in oil, tempera, and pastel on cardboard (1893, National Gallery of Art, Oslo), two pastel examples (1893, Munch Museum, Oslo and 1895, private collection), and a final tempera painting (1910, National Gallery of Art, Oslo). Munch also created a lithographic version in 1895. The various renditions show the artist’s creativity and his interest in experimenting with the possibilities to be obtained across an array of media, while the work’s subject matter fits with Munch’s interest at the time in themes of relationships, life, death, and dread.

For all its notoriety, The Scream is in fact a surprisingly simple work, in which the artist utilized a minimum of forms to achieve maximum expressiveness. It consists of three main areas: the bridge, which extends at a steep angle from the middle distance at the left to fill the foreground; a landscape of shoreline, lake or fjord, and hills; and the sky, which is activated with curving lines in tones of orange, yellow, red, and blue-green. Foreground and background blend into one another, and the lyrical lines of the hills ripple through the sky as well. The human figures are starkly separated from this landscape by the bridge. Its strict linearity provides a contrast with the shapes of the landscape and the sky. The two faceless upright figures in the background belong to the geometric precision of the bridge, while the lines of the foreground figure’s body, hands, and head take up the same curving shapes that dominate the background landscape.

Part 3

If we look into the art work and try to consider our question that whether art gives us its presence in a unique way or not the answer will be positive. As according to formulation theory based on Collingwood’s views the subject of human beings is always in action. In the painting as we can see that understanding can be achieved by describing what happened from an external point of view, but must elicit in the reader’s own mind the thoughts that were taking place in the principal actors involved in historical events. Similarly, the aesthetic procedure is one whereby the artist and spectator jointly come to realize, to come to know, certain mental states. Art is fundamentally expression. If art proper is not the stimulation of preconceived emotion, and not the representation of it either, then what precisely does it mean to say that, nevertheless, art is the expression of emotion? The key is to remember that art is not craft—Collingwood assumes that the reader will accept this, once it is pointed out—and hence the distinction between means and ends does not, strictly speaking, apply. Nor does the distinction between planning and execution.
The following three points emerge from this. 1. To express is to become conscious of an emotion: that is why the distinction between plan and execution cannot be applied. 2. Expressionindividualises; rather than describing the emotion in words whose signification is in principle general, the expression is a feature of the utterance itself (although he does not credit him, this is an evident example where Collingwood follows Croce). Thus we cannot speak of the emotion embodied in a work of art as if it were the content which the art provides the form. 3. The ‘lightening’ of which Collingwood speaks is not that of catharsis, which provides an outlet for the emotion and may take place without its agents being conscious of it at all. It is the achievement of clarity, of focus of mind, which may indeed intensify what is felt rather than attenuate it (though typically it does not).

This last point suggests that there is such a thing as an ‘aesthetic emotion’, but it ‘is not a specific kind of emotion pre-existing to the expression of it’ (117). Instead, it is an ‘emotional colouring which attends the expression of any emotion whatever’ (ibid.) Expression, in this sense, must be sharply distinguished from the betrayal of emotion; one’s tears may be said to ‘express’ one’s sadness, or stamping one’s feet ones anger, but these can occur without the making lucid and intelligible of the emotion that is requisite for expression in Collingwood’s sense. Betrayal can even occur that is wholly unconscious; one can blush without noticing it. The relation between expressive object and emotion is that of embodiment or realization, not of inference.

Thus as I have already said that a thing which ‘exists in a person’s head’ and nowhere else is alternatively called an imaginary thing. The actual making of the tune is therefore alternatively called the making of an imaginary tune. This is a case of creation … Hence the making a tune is an instance of imaginative creation. The same applies to the making of a poem, or a picture, or any other work of art.